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Introduction: Bargaining on constitutions – Political settlements 
and constitutional state-building 
Christine Bell 
Abstract 
This article considers the relationship between constitutions and political settlements and 
locates the special issue articles within this wider discussion. The article points to the 
apparently paradoxical connection between disillusionment with internationalised state-
building techniques on one hand, and increased international faith in constitution-making as a 
state-building tool on the other. Using understandings of the relationship of the constitution to 
political settlement which draws on conventional constitutional theory, it argues that the 
current context of negotiated transitions requires constitution-making to be approached with 
an eye to the distinctive dilemmas of statecraft that pertain in contemporary transitions. The 
most central dilemma concerns how power-balances between political/military elites can be 
broadened to ensure the constitution’s capacity to fulfil its normative role in restraining 
power and delivering broader social inclusion. The pieces which make up this special issue 
draw together development and legal discourses. This article suggests how constitutional 
theory provides a resource for those seeking to promote constitutionalism as a tool for 
reaching political settlements capable of resolving conflict. It also argues that those who seek 
to rely on constitutions for conflict resolution need to understand this enterprise as just as 
political and fraught as all other institution-building efforts. 
I. Introduction 
This special issue addresses constitutional development in countries attempting transitions, 
drawing on peacebuilding, development and international legal discourses. Collectively we 
ask whether constitutions can bear the conflict resolution and democratisation burdens being 
ascribed to them in political transitions. At issue are two types of transition (often 
intertwined): the first from authoritarianism to democracy; and the second from violent 
conflict towards peaceful political settlement. 
We attempt to respond to two apparently contradictory contemporary impulses with regard to 
international intervention in transitions. The first is that of profound international 
disillusionment with transitions across development, peacebuilding, and international legal 
state-building interventions. The second is the international turn to constitutions as a vehicle 
through which to promote and even enforce progressive democratic directions for the 
transition. From the first impulse international actors question the effectiveness of their 
development, peacebuilding and international legal interventions and increasingly are turning 
to politics for explanations. From the second, they paradoxically appear to place renewed 
faith in constitutions and international enforcement of them, as capable of remedying the 
deficits of past state-building approaches. 
This introduction explores this apparent paradox and seeks to locate the other articles in our 
special issue with reference to it. Centrally I suggest that a common thread runs through the 
articles: that transitional constitution-making practices all need to be understood against the 
background politics of transitional struggles of competing groups to ‘own’ the state and a 
countervailing impulse towards a more open rule-based political order. Put another way, 
transitional constitutionalism is characterised by an attempt to navigate from a foundational 
elite pact, to a more normative constitutional order. This article shows how the pieces that 
follow trace how this struggle plays out in constitutional design processes. Each piece in this 
special collection exposes how a particular aspect of constitutional design is shaped by the 
political struggles in transitions over whose interests are placed at the centre of the state. We 
collectively suggest that more attention needs to be paid to the complex constructive 
relationship between constitutional text and political settlement in contemporary transition 
contexts. As a side point, we hope the collection demonstrates the need for further thinking 
on how development theory and constitutional legal theory can better speak to each other. 
II. Politics or law? Coping with the ‘failure’ of transitions 
The era of disillusionment 
Where transitions were once understood as part of a ‘third wave’ of democratisation in what 
would be the ultimate global ‘wave’ of democratisation and peace, this heady expectation has 
long been replaced with caution. 2 More recently, caution has moved to outright 
disillusionment. A quarter of a century of investment in transitions has seen a specific new 
international and regional architecture built to address transitions, new international norms 
promulgated, and expensive development and governance interventions embarked on. It is 
now apparent that these efforts have failed to lead to democracy and peace taking hold 
worldwide, for several different reasons. 
First interrelated problems of state fragility and conflict are even more difficult to transition 
from than interveners realised: peace processes appear to have limited success in breaking 
cycles of fragility, conflict, and poverty. An inordinate amount of attention, intervention and 
money has failed to transform so-called ‘fragile and conflict affected states’ into functional 
democratic structures. Despite strongly internationally supported attempts to broker peace 
agreements and negotiate new constitutional orders, states such as Somalia, Nepal, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan appear to defy all attempts to promote 
transition. 3 With ever present pressures to only fund ‘what works’, these contexts seem to say 
that ‘nothing works’ and that fragile states have mechanisms which render them curiously 
strong and resilient in their ‘fragility’: as de Waal writes facetiously of Sudanese politics ‘it 
changes from week to week but if you come back after ten years it is exactly the same’. 4  
Second, some past relative transitional ‘successes’ appear rather less successful than they 
once did. Across very different regional contexts, many transitional societies, now well down 
the line from their transitional moment, appear still ‘transitional’ and stuck in a ‘no war no 
peace’ liminal space. Transitions in Central America while formally replacing dictatorship 
with democracy appear characterised by enduring forms of ‘state ownership’ by political 
elites, high levels of inequality and exclusion, and high levels of corruption and violence – 
now in the form of organised crime. 5 In Europe, transitions in divided societies such as 
Bosnia or Northern Ireland appear to be ‘stuck’: their apparently liberal democratic 
institutions in uneasy relationship to still tense power-sharing governments based on strong 
forms of group accommodation. In Africa in addition to the transitional ‘failures’ outlined 
above, some once-apparently-successful transitions, notably Burundi, appear susceptible to 
reversal almost overnight, and even the paradigmatic transitional state of South Africa 
appears to be on a less certain liberal democratic trajectory than was once assumed. 
As a result, international intervenors are questioning their practices and attempting to 
understand and respond to these failures. The language varies across diverse international 
actors, but articulation of frustration with failure is similar. Development actors, ranging from 
UK and Australian government aid agencies to the World Bank and the OECD, are 
questioning their approaches to projects of state-building as development. 6 Peacebuilders and 
peacebuilding analysis increasingly seek to understand why the liberal political orders 
supported by their interventions have failed to come about, resulting instead in ambiguous 
‘hybrid’ political orders. 7 Similarly, international legal norm-promoters who have over the 
decades promoted international standards relating to women, peace and security, or 
transitional justice, have also begun to question why legal norms have delivered so little 
change. 
Not only is the sense of failure common to different international actors, but so too is the 
response. Rather than viewing failures as simple bad management, lack of political will, or 
lessons not learnt, international interveners understand a more profound failure to be at play: 
they have failed to understand the local political game in which they were immersed. 
Although they use slightly different language, development, peacebuilding and legal 
interveners appear to be coming to the same conclusion: that they have misunderstood the 
local political dynamics of the transitions that they have intervened in and now require more 
politically smart responses. 
Development actors speak of the need to approach ‘development as politics’, 8 and in 
particular to better understand and navigate ‘the political settlement’ through which elites 
hold and exercise power. The political settlement can be understood as ‘the forging of a 
common understanding, usually between political elites, that their best interests or beliefs are 
served through acquiescence to a framework for administering political power’. 9 
Peacebuilding intervenors, similarly increasingly acknowledge a profound failure to 
sufficiently understand and reckon with the power politics of the countries in which 
interventions take place. The recent reviews from the UN’s Group of Experts on the UN’s 
Peacebuilding Architecture, and its High-Level Panel on UN Peace Operations, and the 
Women, Peace and Security Global Study, for example, all point to a need to better engage 
with the power-politics of local political settlement processes and the need for mandates and 
modalities to be nimble enough to respond to changing local games if they are to be effective. 
10 International norm-promoters also demonstrate a turn to the local in a move towards 
understanding how distinct contexts affect the effectiveness of norms and how elite power 
politics affects the domestic institutions that seek to implement international norms. A recent 
report by ICTJ and the Kofi Annan Foundation, for example, examined truth commissions to 
confront the paradox that while truth commissions have expanded and shown a tendency 
towards uniformity based on their mandates, recent truth-making processes seemed to have 
gone through chronic crises. In place of any attempt to articulate new standards for truth 
commissions they called instead for ‘well-informed analysis of concrete situations’ and seek 
to understand the local conditions which influence whether truth commissions play a 
constructive or unconstructive role. 11  
Insofar as conflict resolution, development and international legal actors have formed 
analysis of why their interventions have failed, the most consistent suggestion has therefore 
been that they have failed to sufficiently understand local political bargaining processes. 
Where they once believed peaceful liberal democracy was taking hold, they now see complex 
and contingent local bargains over access to power. These bargains often frustrate and even 
subvert the outworking of the political and legal institutions in which international actors 
placed their faith for transition. 
Internationalised constitutionalism 
Curiously, however, just when faith in liberal institutional solutions has waned, there is 
evidence of an apparently countervailing rise in faith in constitutions and constitution-making 
as a liberal democratic transition-promoting device. A fast-developing internationalisation of 
constitution-making practices is taking hold. International law is increasingly moving to 
regulate the production of constitutions, through standards dealing with inclusion in 
constitution-making processes and standards providing for forms of group accommodation. 12 
International legal standards are also increasingly moving towards requiring 
‘constitutionalism’ as a ‘good’ per se, and international legal protection of constitutions as a 
tool in preventing ‘democratic regression’. Standards in Africa and the Americas have seen 
the African Union and the Organisation of American States firmly commit to democratic 
government and both have treaties committing their member states to democracy. Both 
entities have recently developed these standards towards more specific prohibitions of 
‘unconstitutional rupture’, or ‘unconstitutional change of government’, to be enforced 
through sanctions and ultimately expulsion from the relevant regional organization. 13 This 
move ties international organisations to the domestic constitution, and to understanding it as 
having a central role in regulating moves towards and away from democratic and peaceful 
societies. 
This new regulation requiring good constitution-making practice and good constitutional 
order, is accompanied by a new international technocracy of constitutional compliance. This 
technocracy includes forms of international adjudication on constitutional validity, for 
example as with the ‘sanctions’ jurisprudence of the AU with respect to its new constitution-
promoting standards, or through new international machinery such as the Venice Commission 
of the Council of Europe which both advises on, and undertakes forms of adjudication of new 
constitutional arrangements. 14  
It is perhaps not surprising that such faith is being placed in constitutions. Constitutionalism 
has an implicit theory of both democracy and conflict-resolution, articulated throughout the 
history of constitutional theory. Constitutions are understood to both capture and create the 
political settlement that grounds and stabilises the resultant political order enabling its orderly 
development. In so doing, they create both the vertical relationship of restraint between the 
individual and the state necessary to democratic practice, but also the potential for a wider 
horizontal relationship of civic trust necessary to minimising violent conflict, often theorised 
in concepts such as the ‘social contract’. This account of constitutionalism understands it as 
critical to state-building. It understands the concept of underlying political settlement or 
social contract as a heuristic way of talking about the political understandings which underpin 
the constitution as text. However, it also views the constitutional text as not just a once-off 
codification of those understandings, but also as a tool which enables their development and 
mutation over time. The constitution while capturing the elite pact of the moment, is a 
document whose endurance depends on its capacity to provide a justificatory narrative for the 
state as a whole. It must transform the elite pact of the moment into a more enduring set of 
social understandings. 
The idea that constitutions are tools of navigation between political and legal conceptions of 
the political order is one that is as old as public law itself. The historical conceptual work of 
Martin Loughlin, provides a useful theoretical basis for understanding the relationship 
between political settlements and constitutional order in the contemporary context. 15 Martin 
Loughlin uses the term droit politique to capture the idea of the political pact (or even 
‘political constitution’) which serves as a set of pre-constitutional understandings which 
shape and give rise to the constitutional text. The transitions of the post-cold war context, as a 
still slim literature demonstrates, have often placed constitutional development centre stage in 
the attempt to broker a new political settlement and given it a starring conflict-resolution role. 
16 However, the practical conditions of this new context are very different from those which 
generated the theoretical accounts which ground established constitutions. In this new context 
we know relatively little about how and when constitutional development achieves the 
necessary balance between elite pact and more inclusive social contract, and the precise role 
that constitutional design and constitutional courts play in this process of ‘statecraft’. 
Despite the differences, the theoretical account of the relationship between social contract 
and constitution has something to say to the context of contemporary transitions. Traditional 
constitutional theory provides a theoretical resource for bringing this very contemporary 
project into conversation with constitutional theory in more settled circumstances. There is a 
similarity between Loughlin’s concept of the droit politique and – to use the language of 
development organisations – that of political settlement as in the acknowledgement by elites 
that they should acquiesce to a common framework for holding power. Loughlin argues that 
constitutions are ‘an exercise in statecraft that functions according to the precepts of the droit 
politique’, by which he means that constitutions as legal documents reflect and respond to 
what might be understood as the fundamental understandings at the heart of the state that 
bind it ‘morally and politically, not legally’. 17 The concept of droit politique therefore bears 
similarities to the concept of political settlement, although for Loughlin the idea of the 
material, or underlying political constitution, is a fairly robust political concept of ‘the right’ 
– that is a concept of a power-brokerage that includes normative commitments to restraint of 
power. In fact, Loughlin’s sometimes strange use of the term droit politique captures the 
ways in which this underlying set of political agreements is related to restraint of power. 
Loughlin’s argument is based on his review of the historical development of public law and 
liberal democracy in Western societies where elite deals evolved towards normative 
commitments over long periods of time. Yet, the relationship he exposes between 
constitutional text and underlying political agreement is one that speaks to attempts to 
support contemporary constitutional development in deeply divided societies because it seeks 
to understand the relationship between political power and constitutionalism as a process of 
statecraft in which the nature of the state is itself under construction. 
There are, however, key elements of the contemporary context which pose distinctive 
challenges for the project of constitutional development as statecraft. The first challenge is 
that of timescale. In contemporary transitions we attempt to develop constitutions almost 
overnight rather than over hundreds of years, and the elite commitment is often more of a 
dirty deal than a commitment to the political right (or droit politique). How then is a 
constitution built on contingent narrow elite bargains, to transform into a more robust social 
contract? The second challenge is how to understand and locate the significant 
internationalisation of contemporary domestic constitution-making processes. In addition to 
being propelled by the power dynamics and bargaining of political elites, contemporary post-
conflict constitution-making often involves international actors and organisations in a critical 
role, posing challenges for articulating the constitution’s legitimacy in terms of its ‘we the 
people’ origins. International actors not only introduce technical assistance, but come with 
particular biases that control the type of political settlement that can be achieved. These 
biases include the prohibition on changing the state’s boundaries, and an impetus towards 
forms of participative constitution-making process. 18 Finally, the contemporary context is 
also distinctive in terms of the sequencing of political settlement and constitution: the 
production of a constitutional text may arise as part of an attempt to document and stabilise a 
new political understanding, but the constitution-making process may precede or come adrift 
from the process of peacemaking and political settlement, as in Yemen, Somalia or Libya, 
and be left with the burden of creating it in almost impossible circumstances of conflict. 19  
III. Constitutional development as statecraft: Locating the special issue 
This special issue attempts to address the relationship between political settlement and 
constitutional development and the statecraft of constitution-making that takes the distinctive 
dimensions of contemporary constitutional transitions seriously. The special collection 
contributions operate as a form of ‘concept album’: discrete discussions over aspects of 
constitutional drafting and adjudication which seek to begin a larger conversation over the 
relationship of contemporary constitutions in conflicted states to political agreement. A 
central thesis runs through the collection, namely that both the practice of constitution-
making and constitutional legal thought must better understand the relationship between 
constitutional text and the politics of elite bargaining that shape and constrain it. We suggest 
that the critical need in contemporary conflict contexts is to understand how to navigate the 
tension between the constitution as reflecting an elite ‘dirty deal’ and the constitution as 
reflecting the droit politique. This tension we suggest affects the design of the constitution-
making processes; it recasts the operation of what look like ‘normal’ constitutional devices 
with a heightened and distinctive politicised role; and it calls for a new understanding of the 
role of courts and judicial review as part of a complex political tapestry of transition. 
The first article, by Charmaine Rodrigues (‘Letting off steam: Interim constitutions as a 
safety valve to the pressure-cooker of transitions in conflict-affected states?’), picks up the 
question of the relationship of securing political agreement to any new legal and political 
order, to the design of constitution-making process. This article reflects a practitioner’s 
experience of the connection between development approaches to political settlement and 
constitution-making. Rodrigues sets out the international modus operandi of incremental 
constitution-making through a two-phase constitution-making process of producing an 
interim constitution and then a final constitution. She shows how the interim constitution has 
been used in ‘fragile and conflict-affected states’, outlining its challenges, but also arguing 
for its benefits. The two-stage model sees an initial interim constitution locking-in an initial 
elite agreement as to the parameters of the polity and securing agreement to a joint 
constitution-making process to produce a ‘final’ constitution. This two-stage process aims to 
both produce a wider political settlement and embody it in a constitution, and is becoming a 
key international modus operandi, driven less ideologically than pragmatically as a logical 
way to do business. An initial agreement to stop fighting is often coupled with some sort of 
interim power-map as to how power will be held and exercised which simultaneously sets out 
the power-map for how the final constitution will be achieved. The coupling of ceasefires 
with constitutions has been criticised. 20 However, undesirable as it may be to link ceasefires 
to constitutional guarantees, they often cannot be decoupled as parties will not move from 
conflict until they get some guarantees as to the political settlement that will prevail. The 
initial interim constitutional documents vary from short constitutional ‘holding devices’, to 
full constitutions which merely have the label ‘interim’. The two-stage process has the 
benefits of enabling incremental approaches to constructing constitutional order, in contexts 
where legitimate legal frameworks are difficult to achieve. In addition to being politically 
plausible the two-stage process appears to have a normative dividend: the interim constitution 
limits the reach of the initial elite deal, by enabling the establishment of a second stage full 
constitution-making process capable of involving much the broader social or political 
participation that is understood as important to constitutional ownership. The interim 
constitution’s ‘unusual’ constitutional features speak to a familiar constitutional project – the 
need to forge political agreement to a common political community as an ongoing political 
process, and to constitutionally institutionalise the restraint of power to enable it as public 
power. 
Yet, for constitutional lawyers the very term interim constitution is paradoxical when viewed 
from a traditional constitutional standpoint. The interim constitution subverts the 
constitution’s normal positioning as a document which rests on prior political consent, and 
which serves to define and articulate the fundamental norms on which the polity is 
predicated. The constitution is recast from a foundational document which stands above and 
is more permanent than ordinary legislation, to a very temporary arrangement which 
anticipates its own replacement. However, as Rodrigues argues, in conflicted states 
constitutional reform is often understood as presenting singular, winner-takes-all 
opportunities. Against this backdrop, it can be useful to more systematically embrace interim 
constitutions as a useful ‘circuit-breaker’ in peace processes because they help broker 
political settlement, while enabling a platform for ongoing peacebuilding. Rodrigues suggests 
that interim constitutions can help build-in a more incremental approach to constitutional 
development which enables the constitution to function more explicitly as a tool of political 
settlement. 
However, interim constitutions also carry risks as Rodrigues also points out. The first risk 
relates to how interim constitutions in sketching the contours of the eventual political 
settlement also create pathway dependencies. The interim constitution may shape and 
constrain the capacity of the end constitution in ways that make it difficult to ensure that the 
elite deal opens up and develops into a more normative constitutionalism. Second, 
international actors tend to engage with the political settlement processes and constitution-
making processes as distinct processes, despite constitutions operating as the legal 
manifestation of the brokered peace. Rodrigues suggests that better awareness of the 
complexity of the relationship between political bargaining and constitutional development 
and the risks of the two-stage process, might assist in smarter design of such processes in the 
future. 
The second article, by Silvia Suteu (‘Eternity clauses in post-conflict and post-authoritarian 
constitution-making’), addresses the ways in which traditional design elements of 
constitutions play a distinctive role in transitional societies with respect to deep political 
division, using ‘eternity clauses’ as her case study. As Suteu points out, literature on 
entrenchment as a means to achieve constitutional endurance has grown in recent years, as 
has the scholarship on unamendable provisions as a mechanism intended to safeguard the 
constitutional project. Less attention, however, has been paid to the promise and limits of 
unamendable ‘eternity clauses’ in contemporary transitional post-conflict settings. Yet, they 
have appeal in the transitional context because they provide a mechanism through which to 
‘hard wire’ core or ‘unnegotiable’ elements of the political settlement into the constitutional 
text, as the eternity clause protecting federalism in the German Constitution illustrates. The 
attraction of eternity clauses from a conflict-resolution point of view, is that they provide 
security for elites that the most critical understandings agreed between opposing elite actors 
will be protected against unilateral change by ‘the other side’, or indeed by the pressure of the 
wider participative processes or demands of international actors. Groups whose place in the 
political order rests on their use of armed force, take a risk to their power in moving from 
violence into transitions, exacerbated by the unpredictability that committing to elections 
brings. In such contexts, constitutional guarantees can play a role in reassuring political 
actors that the deal they are agreeing to, will stick. The relationship of an eternity clause to a 
newly inclusive political settlement is often not immediately visible from the wording of the 
clause itself. While eternity clauses always hard write core elements of political settlement, as 
Suteu traces through her example of Tunisia, choices as to what to place beyond 
constitutional amendment often reflect and entrench an inter-group balance of power. The 
political choices over what to include in eternity clauses reveal a subtext as to critical trade-
offs between elites as to the core requirements of any political settlement, such as 
compromises between secularist and Islamist visions of the state for the groups and interests 
they reflect, or particular territorial balances of power. 
As with Rodrigues’s discussion of interim constitutions, Suteu questions the extent to which 
constitutional design can carry the burden of forging political agreement. She examines 
through her wider comparative positioning of the Tunisian example, how eternity clauses, 
rather than ensuring that the political settlement is stabilised, often merely provide new 
battlefields for the constitution’s destabilisation when elite consent to the settlement is 
withdrawn. She uses the example of Honduras as illustrative. There an eternity clause was 
used by the Supreme Court to remove a President who sought to hold a referendum to extend 
constitutional Presidential limits in what was an attempt to tilt the balance of power. 
However, the international community found the court to be complicit in an 
(unconstitutional) coup which saw the President returned to power. Suteu demonstrates how 
the eternity clause itself became a mechanism for destabilising the constitutional order 
because it could be used to undo the political settlement (by deposing the President), albeit in 
the face of an alternative challenge to undo the settlement (by the President’s extension of 
terms limits and proposed amendment of the eternity clause). In a sense what Suteu’s 
Honduran example illustrates is the form of constitutional crisis that prevails when local 
elites are smart as to how to work within the letter of the constitution when seeking to subvert 
the foundational inter-group deals at its core by attempting to take back unilateral ownership 
of the state in ways that the constitution was understood to prevent. Often these efforts 
involve elite moves and countermoves which take place within the frame of the constitution 
rather than outside it. The example poses a challenge for those who understand the turn to 
domestic constitutionalism as somehow depoliticising judgements over who is behaving as a 
‘good democrat’ and who is not. Suteu’s examples show that it is difficult for international 
interveners doing ‘normal constitutional law’ to articulate the constitutional rights and 
wrongs of each move in terms of the constitution’s text. It is difficult to articulate why such 
moves are ‘unconstitutional’ in terms of the constitution’s text without a political assessment 
of the type of group accommodation the constitution was designed to achieve and the impact 
on democratic prospects of any move from this inter-group ‘deal’. Suteu’s article therefore 
ultimately illustrates both the potential but also the limits of eternity clauses to legalise 
mechanisms of group accommodation and reassurance. 
The second two articles continue the theme that there is a need to understand the political 
bargaining process, but with reference to constitutional adjudication. Both examine the 
distinctiveness of post-conflict or post-democratisation judicial review by apex courts. Tom 
Daly (‘The alchemists: Courts as democracy-builders in contemporary thought’) explores the 
democratisation setting and questions the increasingly onerous role given to courts by 
constitution-makers – a role of maintaining a functioning political settlement and acting as 
engines of transition by ensuring successful democratisation. Constitutional courts, as Daly 
argues, are expected to breathe life into the paper promises of the new democracy’s 
constitutional text; to mediate the text’s shifting relationship with the underlying political 
settlement process; and also to guard and build democracy itself by policing political 
adherence to emerging transnational norms of democratic governance. These combined roles 
are acutely difficult and push courts beyond the realm of legal adjudication in the strict sense 
towards a more heightened political role involving political judgement as to what furthering 
democratic transition demands. 
Daly questions whether international support for independent courts and unthinking 
preferences for such courts to be given strong forms of judicial review, pays sufficient 
attention to the heightened political context in which they will operate. He examines the ways 
in which traditional debates between political and legal constitutionalists around the 
legitimacy of strong forms of judicial review, fail to capture the dilemmas for transitional 
courts in brokering a process between a former elite-captured political order, and a new more 
inclusive and democratic political order. He also notes the lack of attention paid to the 
democratisation role of regional human rights courts, and the complex ways these interact 
with domestic judgements. In line with Rodrigues, Daly notes the complexity of the temporal 
relationship between political settlement and constitution-making – for Daly it plays out even 
in the academic contestation over what comprises the distinctive phase of democracy 
consolidation in which a distinctive role for courts should be understood to be at play. In line 
with the other contributions to the collection, Daly’s contribution on judicial review suggests 
that our traditional debates – in this case over the democratic or counter-democratic 
imperatives of judicial review – need to be rethought to take account of the constructivist 
relationship of the constitution to the democratic political order. 
The fourth article, by Jenna Sapiano (‘Courting peace: Judicial review and peace 
jurisprudence’) also takes transitional constitutional judicial review as its focus, but this time 
focusing on transitions from conflict to peace, rather than on those from authoritarianism to 
democracy per se. As with Daly she notes that even though the scholarship on the legitimacy 
of judicial review is unsettled, a strong constitutional court with authority over constitutional 
interpretation is commonplace in new constitutions – this time post-conflict constitutions. 
Like Rodrigues and Suteu she notes that the parties to a peace process are required to make 
numerous compromises in the interest of reaching a constitutional text and that this context 
means that tensions that present in any constitutional system become more acute and 
heightened in the post-conflict context. Under a constitution with strong-form judicial review, 
the ongoing resolution of those tensions can be left to apex courts to deal with. Using Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Colombia and Northern Ireland as case studies, Sapiano suggests that debates 
between political and legal constitutionalism need to be reconfigured to understand the 
constructivist relationship that judicial review plays with relation to political settlement. She 
points to the development of what she suggests is a new ‘peace jurisprudence’ in which 
courts show themselves aware of this constructivist role. This peace jurisprudence involves 
courts using active purposive interpretation to protect the underlying political settlement from 
constitutional attack, because they view such settlement as essential to the constitutional 
order and effectiveness. Sapiano suggests that courts reviewing peace agreement 
constitutions pay particular attention to the relationship of the constitution to an underlying 
elite settlement, in ways which while appearing politically activist are legitimate. 
Interestingly, however, in a review of how international human rights courts have adjudicated 
in the same or similar cases, she points out how the deference to the underlying political 
settlement shown by domestic courts, is rejected by less politically sophisticated international 
human rights courts. 
IV. Cross-cutting themes 
Together the articles usefully open up a broader set of questions about the role of 
constitutions as enablers of transition to peace and democracy. These transitions pose a 
challenge as to the general applicability of constitutional theory, and also have clear policy 
implications for divided societies. The questions raised as to the relationship between 
political pact and constitutional order, go beyond what each short article can hope to deal 
with, forming a wider research agenda which deserves greater attention, and to which I now 
turn. 
First, and perhaps most problematically for traditional constitutional theory, the articles all 
show the need to have a better theoretical account of the need for shared constitutional 
ownership and group accommodation in fundamentally divided societies. The pieces all 
question how the tension between the constitution as a product of the ‘dirty deal’ of the 
moment, and the constitution as speaking to more universal normative ambitions, can best be 
navigated. This tension between the particularistic pact of the constitutional moment and the 
normative ambitions of the constitution to set out more general rules for the future, is familiar 
to constitutional lawyers in more settled contexts. However, constitutional theory has little to 
say about the need for constitutions to ensure the inclusion of the groups that are central to 
fundamental societal cleavages. 21 The practical difficulty of ensuring the stability of the 
political settlement and the constitutional order in divided societies, arises from the fact that 
often parties whose support for such order is determinative of its existence, move only 
reluctantly from conflict positions into some sort of shared political arrangement. When they 
do so move, they often do so experimentally and try to use the new order, including the new 
constitution, to pursue their battlefield objectives. Common informal agreement would seem 
to be a necessary prerequisite to framing social and political relationships within formal 
institutions: bringing people into formally institutionalised relationships without having 
informal ones in place is almost always highly problematic. However, creating constitutional 
agreement in the face of fundamental disagreement as to the nature, territorial and political 
configuration of the state is exactly the aim of constitution-building in divided conflict 
societies. 
Without a good understanding of the contingencies of the underlying political settlement and 
its very partial nature, any attempt to support constitutional development is likely to be 
outwitted by local elite game-playing. Unthinking support for liberal democratic 
constitutionalism can itself undermine the political settlement, because liberal democratic 
international interveners often remain ambivalent about the group accommodation that lies at 
its heart. 22 Their commitment to individual rights and equality and indeed the very 
commitment to move from the ‘constitution as deal’ towards some more normative sort of 
order mean that they are often committed to unravelling the underlying political settlement, 
without fully appreciating that this is what they are doing. In the push for a more ‘normal’ 
form of liberal democratic constitution, liberal peacebuilders tend to underestimate the nature 
of the underlying political deal, its fragile balances, and its central importance to any 
possibility of stable government necessary to the delivery of equality and human rights. 
However, in failing to understand the nature of the political settlement, international actors 
also fail to grapple with the ways in which the political settlement can also be an obstacle to 
the delivery of equality and human rights, and so lack clear strategies for supporting its 
transformative possibilities even as they seek transformation. 
Second, the articles illustrate the need for further analysis of available process choices 
relating to constitutional design, and analysis as to how particular process choices assist or 
make more difficult the move from the constitution as an elite pact, to the constitution as 
having a more normative transcendent ambition to be a document of good government. 
International actors concerned with ‘good constitutionalism’ and steeped in traditional 
understandings of constitutional design in more settled contexts, often fail to understand the 
ways in which the constitution is being expected to broker agreement between elites where 
there is very little ‘real’ agreement. They consequently fail to understand the burden borne by 
traditional constitutional mechanisms such as eternity clauses, or apex courts, as mechanisms 
for consolidating and extending agreement in contexts of fragile elite balances of power. As a 
result they also fail to anticipate the ways in which these mechanisms can become tools for 
‘spoiling’ the fragile consensus on which the state rests and on which its stability depends. 
Even the short accounts in this special issue illustrate the unintended consequences that can 
result when the traditional constitutional devices interact with elite political bargaining 
processes that are ongoing, incomplete and contested. Each of the articles points in a different 
way to the need to understand the operation of constitutions as fundamentally determined by 
the elite balance of power, and the implementation problems which ensue when there is an 
attempt to shift the balance of power by one group, by a court, or by unwitting international 
actors. 
Thirdly, each article essentially implicitly raises the question of the international politics of 
engaging with domestic politics, and questions of international capacity to play an effective 
role. Those who seek to support constitutional orders as works in progress need to both 
understand the politics with which they are engaging, and to engage politically with that 
politics. What might this look like? It might involve being prepared to articulate the 
importance of forms of inclusion to political settlement, even when achieving inclusion sits in 
an uneasy relationship with individual rights protections. Or it could involve articulating 
political opposition to a party’s attempt to move the constitution away from protection of a 
plural agreed political settlement, back into a unilateral political arrangement, even when it 
takes place within the frame of the constitution. Such interventions would require political 
rather than legal analysis to articulate the constitutional wrong, particularly when the move to 
‘own’ the constitution and undo the inter-group bargain at its heart, is formally compliant 
with the procedure for constitutional amendment. 
However, international interveners often do not understand the subtlety of the often implicit 
or underlying political deal on which the constitution rests, and are often inept at spotting or 
articulating how forms of ‘takeover’ are happening until it is too late. Moreover, most 
international interveners understand their own mandate and legitimacy to limit them from 
overt political engagement, or at least the admission of it, and this restricts both the capacity 
and the will to name political problems in political terms. Indeed to some extent the very 
move from standard-setting around democracy, to standard-setting around good 
constitutionalism has had an attraction because it appears to call for legal rather than political 
judgments. Paradoxically, the recent investment in ‘the constitution’ and ‘constitutional 
change’ as crucial to underpinning a democratic political order, can make it particularly 
difficult to internationally challenge actions which are deeply undemocratic when they have 
good claim to be compliant with the constitutional text. 
To come in a full circle: at the outset I presented the international turn to promote and protect 
constitutions in an era of disillusionment with institutionally-focused state-building as 
paradoxical. However, these two moves are not necessarily as paradoxical as they at first 
appear. It is in part the failure of transitions as driven by international law and organisations 
that is forcing a ‘local turn’ in the form of tying international intervention to the production of 
a domestic set of norms and understanding. Internationalised ‘constitution-promotion’ 
appears to provide a way for international actors to promote democracy and human rights as 
an indigenous political and legal exercise without appearing to be acting ‘politically’, because 
supporting constitutional development often appears as a more ‘legal’ technical matter than 
‘promoting democracy’. 
However, there is a need for development actors to move from a technical understanding of 
constitutions, to an understanding of the process dimensions of constitutions capable of 
seeing their relationship to politics and to controversies over the nature of the state and its 
capacity for inclusion. Similarly, constitutional theorists and lawyers should understand better 
the speedy constructivist role being given to constitutions in the most inauspicious of 
circumstances, and direct some energies to understanding how traditional design features 
might play out somewhat differently in such contexts. Constitution-building and state-
building interventions are often rooted in completely different epistemic communities within 
the academy, and distinct policy communities in the world of practice. While constitution-
making in development organisations is often paid for (or promoted) as part of human rights 
interventions, conflict management approaches emanate more from conflict advisers and 
state-building experts. These are not only different people, but are also in different 
departments in most of the key agencies. However, there are profound ontological reasons 
why state-building and constitution-making discourses have difficulty speaking to each other: 
while international relations scholars and practitioners are moving to embrace ‘failure’, 
‘hybridity’ and ‘post-liberalism’ and respond with concepts of ‘promoting reliance and 
capacity’, the idea of a post-liberal constitution as having any progressive potential is almost 
beyond imagination. 
The contributions of this special issue, suggest that the turn to constitutionalism is unlikely to 
fare any better than past state-building approaches unless it takes on board lessons learned 
from that intervention regarding the need to be more politically savvy. A fast-developing 
international legal regulation of constitution-making stands to benefit from paying more 
attention to the relationship between the constitutional text and the underlying attempts to 
support a more inclusive political settlement. While international organisations caution 
against ‘a blueprint approach’ to their interventions, they tend to revert to blueprints as a 
default position because engaging in a politically smart way with elite power structures and 
agendas at the domestic level is difficult, defies any standardised analysis, pushes to the 
limits of mandates, and is not easy to provide human resources for. If the task is to be 
approached politically there is a need not just to talk about the politics of the local but also to 
talk about the political restraints on international norm-promoters and understand the ways in 
which each interacts. 
Conversely, the political settlement focus of development organisations which focus on the 
political dynamics of elite bargaining and view constitutions as ‘once-off’ moments within 
the broader political settlement process, could benefit from a more process-driven notion of 
constitutional design. The current emphasis on the political settlement as involving ongoing 
bargaining relegates constitutions to once-off institutional ‘moments’. This conception of 
constitutions needs to be rethought in light of their use in transitions to both capture and 
guarantee elite bargains and enable those bargains to grow and transform into broader social 
contracts over time. The constitution is the key power-map in which political commitments to 
inclusion are held together, and it establishes the institutions through which they are to be 
developed and negotiated in the future. There are few constitutional lawyers who view 
constitutions as static texts, and indeed the move from talking about ‘the constitution’ to 
talking about ‘constitutionalism’ recognises the process dimension of the enterprise and a 
distinction between having a constitutional text and having a political and legal order which 
acts as a restraint on public power being used for private ends. Political engagement by 
development actors – who are increasingly involved in supporting constitution-making 
processes – could be assisted by a more process-oriented view of constitutions and better 
understanding of the dialectical relationship between political settlement and constitutional 
development. International interveners might view the challenge as one of intervening in 
more politically smart ways, taking account of both their own political constraints, and the 
political constraints of the complex contexts they seek to influence, without completely 
capitulating to either. 
V. Conclusion 
We suggest that this special issue raises fundamental questions as to the promotion of 
constitutions as a device for ensuring better transition management. These questions are 
central to the wider project of this journal. The concept of global constitutionalism should 
address not just the constitution of the global, or the global rise of constitutionalism, but a 
new internationalised practice of promoting and regulating the domestic production and 
implementation of constitutional texts. This third relatively neglected dimension of global 
constitutionalism implicates the first two because it places centre stage the ways in which the 
domestic constitution, and international law vie to ‘create’ the state and assert different forms 
of authority and legitimacy to do so. 
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